KYNEX Bulletin                                  

May 2008

Corporate Bond versus Credit Default Swap

The Kynex “Corp Vs CDS” analytic is intended to detect and quantify deviations between the bond market and the CDS market. It is intended to suggest possible trades in the CDS market as well as the bond market for a given issuer or issue. Client feedback regarding our “Corp Vs CDS” analytic, as first presented in our September 2007 Flash Bulletin, has encouraged us to revise the presentation of the results. Functionality is highlighted here, and you can follow the links for additional detail and explanation.

v     Given a bond price and its corresponding CDS credit curve, the fair value of the bond is calculated using the CDS credit curve, and an implied CDS curve is determined based upon the bond price. In this way, you can identify richness/cheapness in bond terms and in CDS terms, and hence potential trades. Richness/cheapness is identified in terms of both dollars and spread.

v     The Kynex bond calculator will now accept a CDS credit curve. The bond price is calculated using the CDS curve, and then all subsequent measures are calculated in the usual way.

v     By definition, all CDS spreads are par spreads. When applying CDS credit curves to discount (bond coupon is less than risk-free plus CDS spread)  or premium (bond coupon is greater than risk-free plus CDS spread) bonds, bond spreads are adjusted for Pull-to-Par using a Kynex algorithm based upon total risk and observed market prices. Please see the Appendix for a complete discussion of Pull-to-Par in both a risky and risk-free environment.

v     Kynex allows you to maintain credit curves in two different ways. You can use our Credit Curve Maintenance Utility on individual credits.  You can also transmit via FTP credit curves for numerous credits on a periodic basis. If you maintain a portfolio of corporate bonds with prices as well as credit curves on these credits on Kynex, we can automate the process of identifying potential trading opportunities. Kynex will do the data maintenance for you, and you can focus on trading. We know that some of our clients prefer one source of credit curves over another, so it is important that you send us your view of the curve. If a bond is subordinated and if Kynex has a subordinated curve, the subordinated curve will automatically be used on the “Corp Vs CDS” analytic and the bond calculator.

v     If you know a bond price but the CDS curve is unknown, you can calculate the implied CDS credit curve consistent with that price. CDS spreads can be specified at multiple tenors to establish curvature.

v     For convertible securities, the coupon is obviously not just determined by a spread over a benchmark curve. A convertible investor will give up coupon in return for more option-value on the underlying stock. Kynex is comfortable using CDS credit curves to evaluate a newly issued convertible priced at par if bankruptcy mode is turned on and a spread decay factor has been assumed. It is less clear how to apply credit curves to convertibles in the secondary market that are no longer at par. Kynex will address this issue in a future bulletin.

v     If the bond market and the CDS market essentially agree, there is no trade. But the unfolding credit crisis (as well as special situations involving specific companies) is providing opportunities.  Generally, bond spreads are widening vis-à-vis CDS spreads since the autumn of 2007. Especially for riskier bonds, we believe that bonds have over-reacted to the credit crisis, while tight credits appear to have widened to a lesser extent.  The current inconsistency between the bond market and the CDS market can also be seen in newly issued bonds.  A “credit crunch” premium of 50-75 bps seems to be added to the coupon (e.g. BMY, DELL).


Corp Vs CDS

 

You can navigate to the Kynex “Corp Vs CDS” analytic by first selecting a corporate bond and going to the calculator. From there, you should select the “Corp Vs CDS” link in the left-hand blue margin. For illustrative purposes, we chose the GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 bullet bond. Prior to accessing this bond, the credit curve for the GM senior unsecured credit was entered using the Credit Curve Maintenance screen (all spreads and benchmark curves are at the mid-market). The bond price on 11/1/2007 of 91.6 is a mid-market price with a bid-ask spread of 1.42 bond points. The analysis you see is presented in a two-part tabular format to the right of the inputs section.

 

Corp. Vs CDS Analysis

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016

 

 

 

 

 


In this case, the bond market and the CDS market basically agree. If the CDS market holds exactly, then the bond would be priced at 91.156 rather than 91.60. In terms of bond points, the bond is rich by 0.444 bond points, which is 0.49% of the fair value. This difference is well within the bid-ask spread. In terms of spread, the bond is about 8 bps rich. The fair value is below par because the 7.7% coupon is 294 bps below the bond equivalent (BE) par coupon of 10.6444%.  The par coupon is determined by the CDS calculator using the input credit curve on the left margin. In this case, the par CDS spread is equal to 558.54. The spread over Treasury is not computed by re-calculating the probability of defaults using the Treasury curve as the risk-free curve. Rather, the spread of 637.11 merely reflects the risk-free yield difference between swap and Treasury on 4/15/2016.

 

Trading Opportunities

 

As of 11/1/2007, no trade really existed here since the bond market and the CDS market essentially agreed.  The bond is slightly rich to the CDS, and there is bullish sentiment in the market (The spread on the GM 7.7% bond tightened by about 140bps from mid-September). But a very different situation evolved by 12/20/2007. GM reported a massive $39 billion dollar third quarter loss on November 7, and dismal sales concerns followed shortly thereafter. Even though the widening GM spreads are unrelated to the credit crisis caused by the mortgage market, the GM credit deterioration provides an excellent example for a trade caused by bearish bond spread movements. It will be instructive to decompose the valuation difference between 11/1/2007 and 12/20/2007 into a 34bps decrease in swap benchmark rates and then a widening of CDS credit spreads. In this way, the full impact of the spread widening will be exposed.  On 12/20/2007 (assuming no change in the credit curve from 11/1/2007), the par coupon has dropped by about 40bps. The resulting spread on the bond has widened about 16bps (to swap), and the yield has dropped about 18 to 19 bps.

 

Change in Benchmark Curve, No Change in Credit Curve

Change in Both the Benchmark Curve and the Credit Curve

But the credit curve widening has produced a par coupon of 11.65% from 10.24%. The fair value yield of the bond has widened 68bps to 9.721% because of the spread change, and it tightened by 18.4bps due to the benchmark tightening.  The aggregate yield widening is about 50bps while the aggregate spread widening is about 83.5bps.

 The bond has gone from being a little rich to very cheap when compared to the CDS market. The CDS spread to 4/15/2016 has widened about 137 bps from 558.54 on 11/1/2007 to 695.16 on 12/20/2007. However, since the bond is at a discount, fair value spreads have widened by only 83.5 bps. But bond spreads have widened almost 205 bps from 421.23 to 626.05. The bond is now 6.36% cheap.

The no arbitrage trade on this is obvious. Buy 1000 bonds at 83 and buy $948,100 notional 10 year protection at 690 in order to match spread dv01.  The annual coupon payments ($77,000) received more than cover the annual deal payments (approximately $66,327) paid. If the GM credit deteriorates further, the CDS should “catch up” to the bond by widening more than the bond. If the GM credit improves, the bond should “catch up” to the CDS by tightening more than the CDS.

The speculative trade depends upon your view.  If the bond market has overshot its penalty on this GM bond, the bond should be bought with the expectation that the market will correct to the CDS market levels.  But if the bond market has it right, the CDS should widen, so protection should be purchased. Shorting the bond would be difficult at best in this situation.

Unfortunately, a third possibility exists. What if both the bond market and the CDS market have it wrong?  By 4/1/2008, CDS spreads have widened to almost 1059 from 695 (364bps). Bond spreads have widened from 626 to almost 915 (289bps). The bond is now 10.33% cheap. At 73.56, the bond yields 13.1228% with a total risk of 30.8288.  At 73.56, the yield-to-risk ratio is

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (4/1/2008 Trade, 4/4/2008 Settlement)

0.4257. But the yield-to-risk ratio at par is 0.312 (par risk is 48.475). A rational long-only investor would rather buy the 7.7% coupon bond at 73.56 than a 15.13% coupon bond at 100.  This statement assumes the CDS market is correct. For GM, the bond market and the CDS market are more disconnected than ever by 4/1/2008.

Fortunately, the GM bond “death spiral” does not totally kill the no-arbitrage trade mentioned above. By 4/1/2008, The CDS valuation looks like the following.

The results of the hedge are summarized below.

 

 

The coupon on the bond really helped the total position.

 

 

Tight credits exhibit disconnect between the bond markets and the CDS markets to a lesser extent. The JNJ 5.55% 8/15/2017 and the JNJ 4.95% 5/15/2033 bonds are shown below at mid-market levels. As of 4/10/2007, the market price and the fair value almost agree for the JNJ premium bond, and both have been pulled down from a Price-Without-Pull-to-Par of 108.44.  The prices on the JNJ discount bond have been pulled up from 96.58, but the market price lags the fair value.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But as of 10/31/2007 (please see below), both of these bonds were rich to their fair values. The JNJ premium bond was rich by 1.22%. Its price of 103.04 was even above its Price-Without-Pull-to-Par of 102.16. This means the bond market did not correctly identify the par coupon of 5.266%. The JNJ discount bond was rich by 2.52%. In this case, the market pulled the price up far higher than suggested by the CDS market.  The spread of 4.28 to swaps indicates that the price of 93.75 is far too rich.

 

 

 

 

 

 

It is interesting to note that par coupons on JNJ actually declined from 10/31/2007 to 4/10/2008 even as CDS spread widened.  This means swap rates declined more than CDS spreads widened. Par coupons seem to be lower to flat for many investment grade names, suggesting that bond prices followed the tight CDS spreads seen in the autumn and summer of 2007.

 

 

Determining the CDS Credit Curve from Bond Prices

 

Because the Kynex “Corp Vs CDS” analytic calculates an implied curve, you can use the following methodology to arrive at the appropriate CDS curve given a single bond price. This methodology assumes the bond market is consistent with the CDS market. For illustrative purposes, consider once again the GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 bond on 11/1/2007. Given the bond price of 91.6, calculate the interpolated spread using the corporate bond calculator.

 

 

The interpolated spread of 421.2 should then be used as the CDS spread at the nearest tenor to the maturity of the bond.  The results are below.

 

 

The implied curve suggests that the 10 year point must be 564.59 if the bond price is correct.  Since the entire implied curve is shown, you can decide if the curvature is appropriate.  Suppose you wish to front load additional default early on. You can accomplish this by specifying a larger value (300 rather than 273.98) at the quarter year tenor.

 

The implied curve gives the desired curve. In this case, two tenors define the curve. The quarter year tenor is 291.72, and the 10 year tenor is 556.38.  Kynex uses a logarithmic model that tends toward a spread of zero at settlement (unless overridden by inputting the desired value for tenor of 0.01). It is most appropriately used for investment grade names. For high yield bonds, flat to inverted curves should be used. Curvature and shape will affect the final result. Graphs of the CDS forward rates are shown at the bottom of the CDS Valuation analytic (please refer to the December 2006 Kynex Bulletin for a discussion).

 

More challenging problems are long dated bonds with wide spreads. Consider the WM $7.25 preferred perpetual trading on 4/25/2008. A 30 year workout date of 6/15/2038 should be specified in the bond calculator.

 

 

The spread of 419 should be used at the 30 year tenor point. The implied curve gives a CDS spread of about 490 at the 30 year tenor. But the WM senior curve is inverted. The difference between the one year point and the 10 year point is about 365 basis points.  Therefore, the front part of the subordinated preferred curve should be front loaded as well.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The implied curve gives the preferred curve for WM if the bond price holds.  Spreads can be wide enough to make default a certainty before 30 years. Prices and spreads can be inconsistent.

 

 

 

 

Bond Fair Value Calculation

For a particular credit, currency and subordination level, identifying the bond equivalent par coupon is a necessary first step in order to determine the bond fair value. The par coupon identifies what the coupon would have to be if the issuing company issued a new corporate bond at par. The term structure of these par coupons is presented by the Kynex CDS calculator if a credit curve is specified. If par cannot be identified, it is certainly impossible to accurately price a bond with a lower or higher coupon. Kynex par coupons are bond equivalent, and they have been slightly adjusted so that the Price-Without-Pull-to-Par of a bond with a par coupon has a par price (par is precisely defined here as the flat price when the yield is equal to the coupon, e.g. almost 100.0 when not settling on a coupon date).  The Price-Without-Pull-to-Par for any bond is calculated as the risky present value (using the swap benchmark curve and the CDS credit curve) of the bond’s future cash flows. Once you have accepted the credit curve as accurate, this calculation is rather mechanical. As such, it provides a valuable yard stick not only for theoretical fair values but for market prices as well. In this example, the Price-Without-Pull-to-Par is $83.547. However, the market pulls the market price up to $91.6 (which is 48.97% to par).

Pull-to-Par is a phenomenon usually discussed in the context of embedded options in a bond. However, it would be erroneous to conclude that a bond without calls does not exhibit Pull-to-Par. At other times, Pull-to-Par refers to the inexorable price movement to par as settlement approaches maturity. Pull-to-Par is defined here as the tendency that prices of bonds with coupons other than par are “pulled” back to par the greater the coupon deviation from par. Prices on discount bonds are pulled a bit higher, and premium bond prices are pulled a bit lower because of risk differences. Even in a risk-free market (e.g. US Treasury) in which default is assumed to be impossible, bonds exhibit Pull-to-Par (please see the Appendix for a discussion) because of the differences in interest rate risk. In risky markets, risk differences are greater, and therefore, the “pull” is greater. Discount bullet bonds exhibit Pull-to-Par because they have less default loss if default occurs.  Since they are purchased at a discount, you have less to lose. Note that discount bonds have more interest rate risk (the lower the coupon the higher the duration). Conversely with premium bonds, you have more to lose because you paid more than the face for the bonds. If the premium bond continues to survive without defaulting, the higher coupon does partially alleviate this extra potential loss. Pull-to-Par on a premium bond is frequently referred to as price compression (back to par). Once the par coupon is properly identified, everyone can agree on the direction of the pull. A strong market consensus on the magnitude does not always exist.

In the financial literature, a good deal of time has been spent analyzing the CDS basis, defined as the differential between CDS and bond spreads. Because of Pull-to-Par, the CDS basis cannot be constant. It must vary by bond coupon and the corresponding total risk of the bond. Studies that average the spreads on discount bonds with those of premium bonds ignore a fundamental pricing concept in bond trading (corporates as well as mortgage passthrus).

The Kynex Pull-to-Par algorithm is based upon total risk, and it is based empirically on market prices as well as a self-calibrating component that will adjust to changing market conditions. The CDS market is assumed to be consistent with the bond market, and therefore, it is used to determine default probabilities as well as the par coupon in the bond market.  During the autumn and late summer of 2007, we believe the bond market essentially agreed with the CDS market (please see sample bonds in the Appendix).  A par coupon bond must be priced at par. Therefore, Kynex measures the total risk associated with this par coupon bond in order to determine the yield-to-risk ratio. Given the same credit and subordination level, the buyer or seller should be theoretically indifferent to the coupon level he chooses to buy or sell (excluding liquidity and special situations). Therefore, a bond must be priced so that its yield-to-risk ratio matches that of the corresponding par coupon bond. All bonds with differing coupons should be equally efficient in terms of risk/reward. Risk is comprised of three components. Total risk is comprised of default, interest rate risk and coupon risk. Default risk is defined by the expected loss of the bond due to default. A sample calculation is in the Appendix, and it essentially measures the present value of the expected default once the effect of accumulated coupons has been added in. Interest rate risk is defined as the yield dv01 of the bond. Coupon risk comes about because the par coupon is constantly changing as the benchmark curve and the credit curve change. Penalties for coupons below the current risk-free rate are also included in coupon risk. All pricing is done relative to the par coupon, and therefore the base relationship between yield and risk is self-calibrating. For example, you are willing to buy a discount bond offering a lower coupon, a lower yield and greater interest rate risk (as measured by modified duration) because the expected default risk is so much lower. Without efficient pricing, no rational investor would ever buy a discount bond if there is a choice. Conversely, a premium bond is not so attractive because the expected default risk grows rapidly despite the lower interest rate risk. The Kynex Pull-to-Par algorithm can best be understood by showing how the algorithm would price the GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 bond if the bond had a range of other coupons.

Kynex Pull-to-Par Algorithm

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

Additional Coupon Levels Shown

For comparison purposes, please find in the Appendix a table showing several pricing hypotheses which we reject as overly simplistic. The results in that table are graphed below. The “Yield vs Coupon” graph shown below plots yield versus coupon for the four pricing hypotheses. The yield based upon Price-Without-Pull-to-Par (YWOP2P) is roughly equivalent to the constant spread assumption. For discount bonds with coupons close to par, the Kynex yield closely follows the assumption that total risk is entirely defined by default (little adjustment for interest rate risk and par coupon volatility). Discount bonds are inherently attractive since they are redeemed at a price above the purchase price. Investors are more cautious of premium bonds whose price will trend down to par over time.

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement

The graph of “Price vs Coupon” (above) shows that the fair value price basically follows the default loss curve for discount bonds. For premium bonds, the default loss curve “pulls” the fair value curve away from the PWOP2P curve. Not surprisingly, the PWOP2P curve is a linear function of the coupon (unfortunately, pricing is not that easy).

The Kynex Pull-to-Par algorithm will make the total risk values be an increasing function of the coupon.  The larger the discount, the smaller the risk. The larger the premium, the larger the risk. For very high coupon bonds, the accumulated coupons offset the higher default risk.

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

Other relationships are less obvious.  Please refer to the dP/dC section of the Appendix as well as the graphs below showing “dP/dC vs Coupon”. Since the price-without-pull-to-par (PWOP2P) curve is a linear function of the coupon (C), the DPWOP2P/DC is constant. Further, it must serve as a cap for DP/DC.  Therefore, the following relationship holds for any given coupon level.

As the discount deepens, DP/DC approaches DPWOP2P/DC.  For premium bonds, DP/DC decreases as price compression increases for increasing coupons. The discontinuity in DP/DC at par exists even if default is impossible. Every attempt at smoothing creates inferior pricing around par for discount bonds as well as premium bonds. For Treasuries, the risk-free rate acts as a yield floor for discount bonds as the coupon goes further below par.

 

 

 

 

 

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

T 4.75% 8/15/2017 (912828HA1) and T 8.875% 8/15/2017 (912810DZ8)

 

 

Appendix

 

Calculation of Price-Without-Pull-to-Par

Using PV Cost of Default

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

 

Note: The discount factors and default rates shown above take into consideration

the difference in standard settlement between bonds and CDS.

PV Cost of Default Model explained in the December 2006 Kynex Bulletin.

 

 

Bond Equivalent Adjustment from CDS Par Coupon

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

CDS Par Coupon = 10.4208%, BE Par Coupon = 10.6444%

 

 

Yield and coupon are determined so that they are equal and the price based upon the yield is equal to the price of the discounted flows using the risky rates derived from the CDS credit curve. As shown above, the CDS Par Coupon must be adjusted for this constraint to hold. Most of this adjustment is required because of the adjustment from a quarterly ACT/360 basis to a semiannual 30/360 basis. For example, a 10.4208% quarterly Actual/360 rate is equivalent to a 10.71% semiannual 30/360 rate. This adjustment to the coupon rate ensures the Price-Without-Pull-to-Par is exactly par for a par coupon bond.

 

 

 

Treasury Prices Exhibiting Pull-to-Par

T 4.75% 8/15/2017 (912828HA1) and T 8.875% 8/15/2017 (912810DZ8)

(2/4/2008 Trade, 2/5/2008 Settlement)

 

T 4.75% 8/15/2017 and T 8.875% 8/15/2017 both have identical maturity dates and cash flow cycles. On 2/4/2008, the 4.75% bond traded at 108-24+ and the 8.875% bond traded at 141-07. Default loss is not possible, but both bonds have interest rate risk. Risk-free discount factors are derived from the Treasury curve on 2/4/2008, and the par coupon and the bond equivalent risk-free coupon is calculated as 3.603168%. If a Treasury existed with a coupon of 3.603168%, it would be priced at par. At par, this par coupon bond has a yield of 3.603168 and a yield dv01 of 8.000273985, giving a yield-to-risk factor of 0.450380575. Theoretical pricing implications are shown below.

 

 

In order for the buyer to be theoretically indifferent, T 4.75% 8/15/2017 should be priced at 107.98 and T 8.875% 8/15/2017 should be priced at 135.99.  The yield-to-risk ratio for the 4.75% bond is 0.4353 (3.6522/8.3901) and 0.3746 (3.7013/9.8809) for the 8.875% bond based upon market prices. Even though the market prices are substantially higher than the model prices, the market prices are still significantly below the price without-pull-to-par. For both of these premium bonds, prices are being compressed back to par.  Excluding liquidity and other special situations, the investor wanting to buy a Treasury with a 8/15/2017 maturity should never choose the higher coupon in this case. For marginally extra yield, the investor picks up additional interest rate risk.  It seems far more efficient to buy the 4.75% Treasury, especially if the investor knows he might need to unwind his position at some time in the future before maturity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Expected Default Loss

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

 

 

 

Comparison of Alternate Pricing Hypotheses

 

 

 

 

 

Pull-to-Par Algorithm (dP/dC)

GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 (11/1/2007 Trade, 11/6/2007 Settlement)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Matching Spread DV01

1000 GM 7.7% 4/15/2016 Bonds and $948,100 10 Year CDS at 690bps

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sample Bonds Priced on 8/7/2007

 

 

Credit Curve Maintenance

 

 

 

 

BMY 5.45% 5/1/2018

 

Using mid-market CDS spreads, the par coupon is 4.77 but the coupon is 5.45. The coupon penalty for BMY imposed by the bond market appears to be a substantial 68 bps.

 

 

 

DELL 5.65% 4/15/2018

 

Using mid-market CDS spreads, the par coupon is 4.97 but the coupon is 5.65. The coupon penalty for DELL imposed by the bond market appears to be about 68bps.